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ABSTRACT 
African customary law is recognized as a legitimate legal system under the South African 
Constitution. The Constitution further protects fundamental human rights including women’s 
rights. Due to the patriarchal nature of most customary laws, the conflict between African 
customary law and human rights was unavoidable. A number of customary laws and harmful 
cultural practices directly and indirectly violate women’s rights and ultimately, contribute to the 
domestic violence scourge in South Africa. 
This dissertation examines whether domestic violence laws in South Africa can reconcile the 
tension between African cultural norms and the requirements for human rights. It is proposed 
that in order for domestic violence laws to bridge the gap between customary law and human 
rights, such laws must reflect the realities of people who rely on them for protection and the law 
must be enforced and interpreted in a way that does not validate any patriarchal stereotypes and 
attitudes. Furthermore, in reconciling African customary laws with women's rights, courts and 
legislators need to develop customary laws that are discriminatory against women in line with 
the constitutional principles of equality and dignity.  
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1. Introduction 
Karabo Mokoena was only 22 years old when she went missing. The incidents following her 
disappearance drew considerable attention from the media, political parties and the government. 
The young woman’s remains were discovered by a passerby in a veld where her body had been 
burnt by her boyfriend, Sandile Mantsoe. Earlier that year, Karabo had been hospitalized after 
sustaining injuries from yet another violent incident with Sandile. In May 2017, Sandile was 
sentenced to 30 (thirty) years imprisonment for the murder of his girlfriend. Although Karabo’s 
murder sparked public outrage, this is not the first case of this nature and it was certainly not the 
last.1 
Violence by intimate partners is the leading cause of death among South African women and more 
women are killed by their current or former intimate partner in South Africa than in any other 
country in the world. Every eight hours (on average) a woman dies at the hands of an intimate 
partner in South Africa. Household surveys by the South African Medical Research Council found 
that 40% of men have hit their partners and one in four men has raped a woman.2 
While police statistics on domestic violence are limited, 64 500 cases of rape were reported 
between 2011 and 2012. In addition, even though a quarter of the country’s women have been 
raped, only 2% of those raped by an intimate partner reported the matter to the police.3 
Gender-based violence has been prevalent and endemic for many years. The dawn of 
constitutionalism in post-apartheid South Africa gave rise to feminist movements which lobbied 
for the recognition of women’s rights against gender-based violence. In response, section 12 of 
                                                             
1S v Mantsoe SS 104/2017 (unreported). 
2South African College of Applied Psychology “The Growing Epidemic of Domestic Violence in South Africa” 2018 
https://www.sacap.edu.za/blog/counselling/domestic-violence-south-africa/  (04-11-2018) 
3ibid. 
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the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 guarantees women the right to be free 
from violence as well as the right to security and control over their bodies. This necessitated the 
enactment of a legal framework as an avenue for the promotion and protection of these rights. 
The South African Domestic Violence Act, in particular, has been lauded as one of the most 
empowering for women in the world.Despite this excellent constitutional and legal 
framework,domestic violence remains rampant in the country as indicated earlier. 
This raises questions about the efficacy of the law in combating this domestic violence scourge. 
The law alone, in my view,without an interrogation of the social structure and underlying 
attitudes will not succeed in addressing domestic violence. Attitudes that enable violence against 
women are a recurring feature in society. One such dimension which I shall subject to analysis 
involves the attitudes inherent in African customary law.4The root causes for the state’s failure to 
curb domestic violence are certainly not limited to African customary law; however, it is the 
objective of this dissertation to address the direct and indirect influence of African customary 
law on the incidence of domestic violence.  
This dissertation is going to examine the interplay between domestic violence and patriarchal 
attitudes as well as customary practices that underpin the continued scourge of domestic violence 
and it will ultimately seek to make recommendations about how the law can address these 
attitudes.As a starting point, the protection of women against gender discrimination and domestic 
violencewill be addressed in the context of the international, regional and domestic human rights 
framework. Thereafter, customary law will be defined and a distinction will be made between 
living customary law and its official version. The majority of customary law rules and practices 
are not codified, thus creating a challenge when ascertaining the existence of these practices. 
                                                             
4Bowman “Theories of Domestic Violence in the African Context” 2003Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 
852. 
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This warrants a brief discussion on the legal position of African customary law in South Africa 
and whether our judicial system is effectively developing this system in line with the Bill of 
Rights. 
Emerging African literature provides support to causal theories pertaining to the power of 
African culture and its links to the widespread incidence of domestic violence.5 Some of these 
cultural explanations point to the direct nexus between harmful cultural practices and domestic 
violence. Therefore, the second segment of this dissertation will address detrimental cultural 
rules and practices which directly render women vulnerable to domestic violence. 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation will address detrimental African customary rules, practices and 
norms which indirectly contribute to the domestic violence epidemic in South Africa. This 
includes customary rules of succession such as the dogmatic rule of primogeniture which 
influence women to stay in violent relationships by ensuring that they remain economically 
dependent on their abusers and the lobolo practice to the extent that it promotes patriarchal 
attitudes about women being the property of their husbands. 
Finally, a brief comparative analysis between the South African and Zimbabwean domestic 
violence legislation will provide the basis for recommendations that piecemeal legal reforms are 
unlikely to provide an effective remedy to domestic violence and therefore, legislation should be 
enacted to address harmful cultural practices such as child marriages.6 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 Bowman (n 4) 853. 
6 Bowman (n 4) 850. 
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Chapter 1 
Violence against Women within the International, Regional and Domestic Human Rights Law 
Framework 
Domestic violence continues to be a widespread threat not only to South African women but to 
women's rights worldwide.7 Studies estimate that between 20 to 50 per cent of women in the 
world have experienced physical violence at the hands of an intimate partner or family 
member.8In response to this challenge, a comprehensive body of international and regional 
conventions have been developed in order to address the human rights aspect of domestic 
violence and to elaborate on states’ responsibilities to prevent, investigate and protect women 
from domestic violence.9This chapter outlines the relevant international and regional human 
rights law framework and the corresponding state obligations.  
1.1. The International Human Rights Law Framework 
In recent years, states have recognized domestic violence as a global epidemic which infringes 
on women’s rights to equality, security, dignity, and their right to enjoy fundamental freedoms, 
and, thus an international consensus has developed on the need to address the issue.10 The 1990s, 
in particular, witnessed concentrated efforts on the part of the international community to engage 
with this issue.11 These efforts at combating domestic violence were bolstered at the World 
                                                             
7 Beninger “The Effectiveness of Legislative Reform in Combating Domestic Violence: A Comparative Analysis of 
Laws in Ghana, Namibia and South Africa” 2014 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 76. 
8 Kapoor “Domestic Violence against Women and Girls” 2000UNICEF Innocenti Digest, 2. 
9ibid. 
10 n 8 above. 
11ibid. 
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Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993) where the rights of women and girls were 
acknowledged as “an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights.” 12 
Thereafter, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women adopted by UN 
General Assembly in December 1993 became the first international human rights instrument to 
deal exclusively with gender-based violence. This groundbreaking document broadly defines 
domestic violence as “physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, 
including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, 
marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-
spousal violence and violence related to exploitation.”13 
Despite its failure to expressly address violence against women, the United Nations Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)condemns 
discrimination against women in all its forms, and urges state parties to pursue policies 
eliminating discrimination against women through the embodiment of the principle of the 
equality of men and women in their national constitutions, and the adoption of appropriate 
legislative and other measures, prohibiting all discrimination against women.14 This convention 
was ratified by South Africa in December 1995. The CEDAW Committee used General 
Recommendation No 19 on Violence against Women to expressly acknowledge gender-based 
violence as a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and 
freedoms on the basis of equality with men.15 
                                                             
12n 8 above. 
13Article 2 (a) of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, 1993. 
14 Article 2 of Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 1995. 
15UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No 19 para 24. 
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Furthermore, CEDAW instructs state parties to take all appropriate measures in order to modify 
or abolish existing customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women, with a 
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary practices which are based on the 
idea of inferiority or the superiority of either sex or on stereotypical roles for men and women.16 
In addition to the above provisions, Article 16 of CEDAW requires state parties to take all 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to 
marriage and family relations. Article 16(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
similarly addresses the equality of spouses.17  In terms of this provision, men and women of full 
age are entitled to equal rights to marriage, during the marriage and at its dissolution. The 
provisions of the Declaration have been replicated in the International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights which is binding in South Africa.18 
1.2 The Regional Human Rights Approach to Domestic Violence 
The international legal framework outlined above has been augmented by a regional human 
rights framework. This is commendable as the African human rights framework highlights 
African values and priorities, while reflecting a universalist approach to human rights by 
incorporating international standards.19 
For instance, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa(Maputo Protocol) calls on state parties to condemn all forms of harmful practices that 
negatively affect the human rights of women and which are contrary to recognized international 
                                                             
16 Article 2 and 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 1995.  
17 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 1948. 
18International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976. 
19 Beninger (n 7) 85. 
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standards.20 Harmful practices are defined in the Protocol as “all behavior, attitudes, and/or 
practices which negatively affect the fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their right 
to life, health, dignity, education and physical integrity.”21 
The Maputo Protocol guarantees women a number of comprehensive rights including the right to 
dignity in article 3(4), which includes the State's duty to protect women from “...all forms of 
violence, particularly sexual and verbal violence” and article 4 protects the right to integrity and 
security of the person, which includes an express duty upon States to “enact and enforce laws to 
prohibit all forms of violence against women including unwanted or forced sex whether the 
violence takes place in private or public.”  
1.3.The Domestic Violence Legal Framework in South Africa 
As a signatory to the above instruments, South Africa is bound to ensure the advancement and 
protection of equality in terms of section 39(1) (b) of the Constitution which requires courts and 
tribunals in the Republic to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. In 
addition, when interpreting any legislation, any reasonable interpretation of legislation that is in 
line with international law is preferable over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law.22 
The South African Constitution reflects international and regional human rights norms through 
its commitment to the advancement of equality, human rights and freedoms which form the 
                                                             
20Article 5 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. 
2003. 
21n 19 above, article 5(b). 
22Section 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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cornerstone of the Constitution. Furthermore, equality and non-sexism are the founding values in 
our state.23 
The right to equality is buttressed in section 9(1) of the Constitution which provides that 
everyone is equal before the law and entitled to its full protection. The Bill of Rights expressly 
prohibits direct and indirect unfair discrimination by the state and individuals, respectively.24 
Unfair discrimination is prohibited on the grounds listed in section 9(3) which include sex and 
gender. Moreover, section 9(4) places a duty on the state to enact national legislation which 
prevents or prohibits unfair discrimination. 
In Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, the right to equality was held to be one of the most valuable 
rights in an open and democratic society.25 The Constitutional Court has consistently affirmed 
that the right to equality is concurrently recognized in section 9 of the Constitution and several 
international instruments, and its value has been recognized as a priority even in the face of 
competing claims such as the right to culture.26 
Domestic violence infringes on several rights guaranteed in the South African Constitution, more 
pertinently on the right to freedom and security of the person which includes the right to bodily 
and psychological integrity and also the right not to be treated in cruel and inhumane manner.27 
This right can be read together with the right to life, the right to human dignity and the right to 
equality. 
                                                             
23 Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
24 Section 9(3) and 9(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
25Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha2005 1 SA 580 (CC) par 71. 
26Mwambene, Sloth-Nielsen “Benign Accommodation? Ukuthwala, ‘Forced Marriage’ and the South African 
Children’s Act” 2011 African Human Rights Journal. 
27 Section 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. . 
14 
 
It is of paramount importance to have effective domestic laws which reinforce the 
aforementioned international and regional initiatives. The South African Law Commission has 
submitted that: 
“The law cannot be employed as a panacea for the ills of a complex social phenomenon such as 
domestic violence. However, when victims of domestic abuse do turn to the law for protection, 
the law should be effective and efficient in its response…by ensuring that the substance and 
procedures of domestic violence legislation are well tailored to the needs of those suffering 
abuse in a domestic context.”28 
In order to achieve this objective, the Domestic Violence Act was enacted. The Preamble of this 
Act refers to South Africa's international human rights obligations and its constitutional 
guarantees of equality, and states that the purpose of the Act is to ensure the “maximum 
protection” possible to victims of domestic abuse.29 This Act was enacted in response to the 
“high incidence of domestic violence within South African society,”30 and effectively replaced 
the Prevention of Family Violence Act of 1993, an earlier legislative attempt at eradicating 
domestic violence. 
Although the 1993 Act became the first national legislation which dealt with domestic violence 
on the African continent, it was widely criticized due to its vague terms and limited application. 
Unlike its predecessor, the new Domestic Violence Act is more inclusive and “viewed 
internationally as amongst the most empowering for women of any in the world.”31 It is notable 
for its comprehensive approach to defining and prohibiting domestic violence. According to the 
                                                             
28South African Law Commission “Research Paper on Domestic Violence” 1999, 2. 
29Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. 
30 Preamble of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. 
31 Jewkes, Levin and Penn-Kekana,”Risk factors for domestic violence: findings from a South African cross-sectional 
study” (2002) Social Science and Medicine,1603. 
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Act, domestic violence involves those who are in a domestic relationship, which is defined very 
broadly to include: married persons (current or former); current or former unmarried cohabitating 
couples (both opposite and same sex); parents of a child; family members related by blood, 
affinity or adoption; any couple currently or formerly in a dating relationship or engagement; or 
any persons who share or recently shared the same residence. Thus, the scope of protection of 
this Act extends further than that of the 1993 which applied only to “parties to a marriage.” 
Under the 1993 Act, “family violence” was not defined and there was no clarity on whether this 
included other forms of violence apart from physical violence. This has been rectified in the 
current Act which comprehensively defines domestic violence to include physical, sexual, 
psychological, and economic abuse, harassment, intimidation, stalking, damage to property, 
unauthorized entry to the applicant's home, and “any other controlling or abusive behavior,” 
which causes, or may cause, imminent harm to the complainant's safety, health or wellbeing.32 
 Fedler criticized the Prevention of Family Violence Act for its exclusion of women who have 
never cohabitated with their partners in a marital relationship.33 In addition, she noted that the 
Act did not reflect international trends; in as far as it omitted a number of intra familial 
relationships from its ambit.34 
Another shortfall of the Prevention of Family Violence Act was raised in S v Baloyi.35 In this 
case, the Constitutional Court had to decide on the constitutionality of section 3(5) of the Act to 
the extent that it placed an onus on respondents to prove their innocence. The dispute in this case 
arose between an army officer (the appellant) and his wife (the complainant) after the appellant 
                                                             
32 Section 1 of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. 
33 Fedler “Lawyering Domestic Violence Through the Prevention of Family Violence Act 1993 - An Evaluation After 
A Year in Operation” 1995 SALJ 231. 
34ibid. 
35S v Baloyi 2000 2 SA 425 (CC). 
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was convicted for breaching an interdict issued by a magistrate ordering him not to assault his 
wife or prevent her or their child from entering or leaving their home. 
The appellant was found guilty and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment, six months 
suspended. He appealed to the Transvaal High Court which declared that section 3(5) of the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act of 1993, was unconstitutional to the extent that it placed an 
onus on him to disprove his guilt. The court interpreted section 3(5) to impose such onus because 
this provision invoked the procedure of section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which 
required accused persons who failed to appear after an adjournment to prove that their absence 
had not been willful. 
The High Court found that “the limitation of the right to be presumed innocent could not be 
justified under section 36 of the Constitution inasmuch as the injustice of sending an innocent 
person to jail outweighed the evil flowing from the difficulties encountered by the state in 
establishing proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”36  The High Court then sent its order of 
constitutional invalidity for confirmation by the Constitutional Court. When interpreting section 
3(5), the Constitutional Court held that this provision did not create a reverse onus or have an 
effect on the presumption of innocence of an accused person.37 Therefore, the Court did not 
confirm the order of invalidity. 
The judgment of Justice Albie Sachs, in which all members of the bench concurred, endorsed the 
view that domestic violence reflects and reinforces patriarchal domination in as far as it is 
systemic, pervasive and overwhelmingly gender specific.38 It transgresses the constitutionally 
                                                             
36S v Baloyi (n 35) par 8. 
37S v Baloyi (n 35) par 31. 
38 S v Baloyi (n 35) par 1. 
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guaranteed right to be free from violence from either public or private sources. The court found 
that “failure by the criminal justice system to address family violence leads to the normalization 
of patterns of systemic sexist behavior.” The terrorisation of the individual victims is thus 
compounded by a sense that domestic violence is inevitable and the impunity enjoyed by spouse-
batterers undermines the non-sexist society promised in the foundational clauses of the 
Constitution.39 
The Constitutional Court explained that the principal objective of granting an interdict is not to 
solve domestic problems or impose punishments, but to provide a breathing-space that enables 
solutions to be found. The Court noted that interdicts “seek preventive rather than retributive 
justice, undertaken with a view ultimately to promoting restorative justice.”40  Furthermore, 
interdicts were intended to offer physical protection to the weaker party in the period when other 
legal mechanisms, such as divorce proceedings or criminal charges, are being pursued.  Thus, the 
overall purpose of an interdict was to “protect the victim of domestic violence, uphold respect for 
the law and indicate that organised society would not sit idly in the face of spousal abuse.”41 
However, Dicker was of the opinion that the Act provided protection to the victims of domestic 
violence “at an unacceptably high price,” based on its disregard for the audi alteram partem 
principle, a common law principle which requires both parties in a dispute to be heard.42 This 
disregard was evident from section 2 of the Act which required the judge or magistrate to grant a 
final interdict, with potentially serious repercussions against a respondent without hearing his 
                                                             
39S v Baloyi(n 35) par 12. 
40n 35 above. 
41S v Baloyi (n 35) par 18. 
42Dicker “The Prevention of Family Violence Act: Innovation or violation?” 1994 De Rebus 213. 
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submissions. The audi alteram partem only applied to the respondent after service of the 
interdict and orders upon him.43 
In coming to its decision, the Constitutional Court held that section 12(1) in conjunction with 
section 7(2) of the Constitution, the latter of which obliges the state to protect, respect, promote 
and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, places a duty on the state to protect everyone’s right to 
be free from private or domestic violence. 
It has been submitted that that with the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act, the South 
African government has to a large extent succeeded in fulfilling the international obligation 
required by CEDAW towards ending violence against women. However, the author submits that 
this Act does not address its obligation under this convention to modify or abolish existing 
harmful customs and practices. 
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) has 
attempted to fulfill this obligation by recognizing that any practice including traditional, 
customary, or religious practice which impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality 
between women and men, including the undermining of the dignity and wellbeing of the girl 
child constitutes unfair discrimination. 44 
It is evident that South Africa has a good legal framework in place to address violence against 
women. However, domestic violence is still the leading cause of death amongst South African 
women and most of the cases are not reported because traditional attitudes about the private and 
generally acceptable nature of domestic violence still persist.  
                                                             
43 South African Law Commission (n 28) 21. 
44Section 8 (d) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
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In most traditional communities, violence has become normalized due to the nexus which often 
exists between violence against women and harmful cultural practices. As a result, most 
perpetrators of violence against women count on the fact that their actions will not be 
questioned.45  Challenging this impunity and the general acceptance violence against women is 
‘vital to curbing the domestic violence scourge in South Africa. Harmful cultural practices are 
usually protected under African customary law and this makes it difficult to eradicate them. 
However, the Constitution makes it clear that any laws inconsistent with it should be invalidated. 
The following chapter will discuss the status of customary law in this constitutional democracy 
and cultural practices that directly involve the perpetuation of domestic violence. 
  
                                                             
45Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 2 
African Customary Law in South Africa 
2.1 The Distinction between Living Customary Law and Official Customary Law 
African Customary law is expressly protected by the Constitution in its own right and 
specifically entrenched in section 211(3) of the Constitution which instructs the courts to apply 
customary law only when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation 
that deals with customary law. In Alexkor v Richtersveld Community, the Constitutional Court 
found that customary law must be recognized as an "integral part” of the law and "an 
independent source of norms within the legal system."46 This was echoed by Judge Van Der 
Westhuizen in Shilubana v Nwamitwa wherein he explained that the status of customary law 
requires respect.47 
This fully-fledged recognition of the right to culture alongside gender equality was the subject of 
heated debates during the Certification process.48 While traditional leaders argued that the value 
system of the country should reflect the culture of the majority, human rights activists expressed 
their concern that some practices which are irreconcilable with constitutional norms would be 
sanctioned circuitously, thus shielding the patriarchal and sexist domination of women from 
constitutional challenge.49 
Consequently, the relationship between the right to culture and the right to equality was resolved 
by placing a duty on our courts to ensure that despite the historic marginalization of customary 
                                                             
46Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2003 12 BCLR 1301 (CC) par 50. 
47Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa 2008 ZACC 9, par 69. 
48Ntlama”Development of the Customary Law of Succession: Lessons from Shilubana vNwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 
(CC)” 2009 STELL LR 335. 
49 Ntlama (n 48) 336. 
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law, it must adhere to the Bill of Rights by, amongst other things, prohibiting all forms of 
discrimination against both men and women.50 This was affirmed in Du Plessis v De Klerk,51 
where the court found that the courts have an obligation to develop customary law in a manner 
that imbues it with the values embodied in the Bill of Rights.52 
Nhlapo submits that when the court makes reference to customary law, it is specifically referring 
to living customary law.53 It has been further submitted that official records and statements by 
academics should not be used as sources for the application of customary law; instead recent 
applied research on the customary practices of the communities concerned should be relied 
upon.54 These views were reiterated in the Bhe case, when the court warned against the reliance 
on official records where customary law is readily ascertainable.55 
A distinction must be made between living customary law and official customary law. Unlike its 
official version, living customary law is not set in stone and mirrors the actual practices of 
traditional communities. It contains contradictory rules thus allowing it to be more flexible.56 
Living customary law it has thus been described as “porous and malleable.”57 The fluidity of 
living customary law is beneficial as it allows for the substitution of old rules with new practices 
that better suit the needs of communities over time.58However, the non-existence of written 
sources regarding customary rules makes customary law difficult to trace. 
                                                             
50 Ntlama (n 47) 339. 
51 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) par 167. 
52 Ntlama (n 47) 341. 
53Nhlapo “Indigenous law and Gender in South Africa: Taking Human Rights and Cultural Diversity Seriously” 1994 
Third World Legal Studies 53. 
54Ntlama (n 47) 338. 
55Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha (n 25) par 168. 
56 Bonthuys, Curran “Customary Law and Domestic Violence in Rural South African Communities” 2005 SAJHR 611. 
57Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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In contrast, official customary law is mostly codified and thus does not contain the same fluidity 
and flexibility as living customary law. South African courts apply the official customary law as 
provided in legislation. The application of customary law in the courts is a result of its 
recognition in the new constitutional dispensation; prior to this, the apartheid government 
intervened in African customary law, only when it was necessary to assert control over 
traditional communities. The use of the term "African customary law" is not an indication that 
there is a single uniform set of customs prevailing in South Africa. Rather, it is used as an 
umbrella term covering many different legal systems.  
The majority of South Africans conduct their activities in accordance with customary law, 
particularly in the area of family law; however, this system developed in an era dominated by 
patriarchy and, therefore, some of its norms conflict with the human rights principles which 
guarantee equality between men and women.59 Consequently, the courts have an important role 
to play in ensuring that customary law is developed to be consistent with human rights norms 
and contributes to the promotion of equality between men and women. 60 The next segment of 
the dissertation will examine African Customary laws and practices which are in conflict with 
the international human rights framework and the Bill of Rights. I consider practices which 
involve the direct legitimation of violence against women.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
59 Ndulo “African Customary Law, Customs and Women’s rights” 2011 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies87. 
60ibid. 
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2.2 Cultural Practices which Directly Legitimate Domestic Violence 
2.2.1. The Husband’s Customary Right of Chastisement 
The prevalence of pervasive practices in indigenous communities makes them difficult to 
challenge due to their strong links with culture. Cultural norms create a blurred line between 
right and wrong. For instance, if it is generally accepted to beat one's wife, then the community 
will consider it a legitimate action, rather than harmful violence.61Many academic authors have 
made reference to married men justifying domestic violence based on their “customary right of 
chastisement.” Myburg noted that in certain cultures, during a customary wedding celebration, a 
woman is shown a sjambok (stiff whip) as a symbol of her husband’s authority and his right of 
chastisement over her. However, this right is not merely symbolic; “a husband may physically 
discipline his wife for relatively minor infringements.”62 
Venter refers to a 1987 unreported case which took place in the Regional Court of Transkei, 
wherein the accused relied on his customary right physically to chastise his wife as a defense for 
beating her to death.63 Although this right is not recognized by the courts, it appears to be 
commonly observed in traditional communities. 
In certain communities, it is a sign of affection when a man “bothers to chastise” his wife.64 This 
was confirmed by Christina Beninger who conducted a comparative analysis between Namibia, 
Ghana and South Africa, and collected data on community attitudes in all three countries which  
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indicates that “it is considered particularly acceptable to abuse a woman if she has ‘provoked' her 
partner by 'misbehaviour', such as infidelity.” 65 
It has been submitted that the customary rule which prescribes the return of a wife who has been 
“severely mistreated” to her father’s home, offers protection against a husband’s customary right 
to moderate chastisement. According to this rule which is known as phutuma, a husband must 
negotiate to pay compensation for his transgressions if wishes to bring his wife back to her 
maternal home.66 However, this practice is flawed as it is only applied when the violence is so 
severe that it becomes dangerous and impossible for the victim to live with her abuser. This 
extent of the violence is determined by the wife’s family and if they are not satisfied that the 
situation is sufficiently serious, the wife may be sent back to her abuser. In addition, a woman 
may be exposed to continued abuse if her husband pays the required compensation.67 Families 
are often reluctant to intervene in domestic disputes and victims of physical abuse are often 
encouraged to persevere in order to preserve the family structure. 
The above-mentioned cultural discourses contribute to a patriarchal ideological context that 
promotes the normalisation of domestic violence, thereby compromising women’s rights as 
outlined in the Constitution. Therefore, the impetus to maintain the social fabric of society, 
through keeping families systems intact, even when there is violence that is detrimental to a 
healthy family environment, also needs to be challenged.68 
Customary norms that permit violence against girls and women also exist prior to the conclusion 
of a marriage. For instance, women are often sexually violated with the intention to force them 
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into marriage. The practice of ukuthwala which takes place prior to a customary marriage has 
been the subject of public debate recently due to its linkages with physical and sexual abuse. 
2.3. The Concept of Ukuthwala 
Ukuthwala is a culturally-legitimated abduction of a woman whereby prior to a customary 
marriage a young man will forcibly take a girl to his home.69Bennett has defined this practice as 
a mock abduction or irregular proposal aimed at achieving customary marriage.70 The regular 
method for the conclusion of a customary marriage entails a proposal of marriage by the 
potential bridegroom’s family to the family of the intended bride. Subsequent to the acceptance 
of this proposal, lobolo negotiations between the families of the engaged couple commence.71 
Where circumstances exist which make the regular methods for the conclusion of a customary 
marriage challenging, customary law provides “irregular means” for circumventing the 
obstacles; ukuthwala is one of such means.72 
This custom finds its genesis in the IsiXhosa culture of South Africa. Its observance has since 
expanded to other ethnic groups but it is still predominantly practiced by the IsiXhosa 
tribe.73Several customary law experts have submitted that this practice in its traditional form is 
harmless. This was confirmed by the customary law experts in Jezile v S, who described 
ukuthwala as a method instigated by willing lovers to initiate marriage negotiations by their 
respective families where there was some form of resistance to the marriage by the parents.74 
The coercive characteristics of the practice have been condemned as new and deviant to the way 
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marriage traditions were practiced in the past.75 In Jezile v S, the court found that a distinction 
must be made between the traditional practice of ukuthwala and the “current prevailing 
custom.”76The experts in this case identified the following as traditional and essential features of 
ukuthwala:77 
“a) the woman concerned must be of marriageable age;  
b) the consent of both parties is necessary for the performance of ukuthwala; 
c) the woman must put up a show of resistance for the sake of modesty despite having agreed 
to the arrangement beforehand; 
d) the woman is smuggled into the potential bridegroom’s home and put in the care of the 
women of that household to safeguard her safety and reputation. The father of the man must 
then be informed of the potential bride’s presence and the intention to marry her; 
e) sexual intercourse between the couple is strictly forbidden during this period and if it takes 
place either willingly or coercively, it is punishable by the payment of a fine or “bopha” of 
one heard of cattle to the father of the potential bride. This is akin to damages for seduction 
at common law; 
f) the man’s family must send an invitation to the potential bride’s family on the day of the 
ukuthwala or on the following morning to inform them of their daughter’s presence in the 
man’s home. This serves as a sign that the man’s family wishes to commence marriage 
negotiations.” 
In light of the above features, ukuthwala can be viewed as a collusive tactic employed by a 
young couple, who wish to enter into a marriage, to counter any resistance from their families. 
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This traditional form of ukuthwala has been described as an “innocuous, romantic and charming 
age-old custom.”78 
Many academic authors assert that ukuthwala has changed considerably over time into a 
distorted and destructive form which is contrary to the traditionally observed custom discussed 
above.79 Customary law experts argue that the practice has now taken on unfamiliar dimensions, 
where vulnerable young girls are being forcibly married to older men. This misapplied form of 
the practice has been described as aberrant.80In its most abusive form, the forced abduction can 
expose the victims to rape and actual or threatened violence in order to coerce them into 
submission.81 
This form of ukuthwala leads to the conclusion of a forced marriage due to the bride’s lack of 
consent and violates the woman’s right to freedom and security of the person, bodily integrity 
and dignity.82This often occurs with the consent of the girl child’s parents or family who are paid 
a fee under the guise of lobolo to abduct their daughter. Due to the poor socio-economic 
circumstances that are often faced by such families, the money or cattle derived from the 
abduction is often an attractive incentive.83 Our courts have held that ukuthwala should not be 
used as a cloak for coercing young girls into unwanted marriages.84 
Karimakwenda is of the view that the violence and sexual abuse that underlie this practice cannot 
be attributed to a recent abuse of the custom as the custom has always been practiced in this 
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manner.85 This is supported by research which was conducted by Kate Wood in the Transkei 
which proved that in communities which observe the practice, it was generally and traditionally 
accepted that sexual intercourse, whether violently enacted or not, is a crucial part of turning a 
girl into a wife. 86 It is clear from Wood’s interviews that the practice of ukuthwala and any 
violence associated with it was traditionally considered to be normal.  
Ukuthwala relies on a degree of participation and acceptance in parts of many cultural 
communities. These practices are even supported by some traditional leaders as indicated by one 
chief who stated that girls who escape from the houses, where they are detained while awaiting 
marriage were embarrassing their village.87Despite evidence proving that historically, ukuthwala 
often resulted in gender-based violence, the media and government have continue to report that 
“ukuthwala has markedly resurged in an insidious form that is exploitative and violent.”88 This 
stance was also affirmed by the High Court in Jezile v S.89 
2.3.1. Jezile v S: Case Discussion 
In this case, the Appellant, a 28-year-old male, ordinarily resident in Phillipi travelled to a rural 
village in the Eastern Cape in search of a potential wife. The Appellant noticed the complainant 
who was then only fourteen years old and decided that she would make a suitable wife. His 
family and the male family members of the complainant initiated and concluded marriage 
negotiations within one day and the following morning the complainant was called to a meeting 
where only the male representatives of the two families were present. 
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Her male relatives informed her of the impending marriage and introduced her to the appellant 
whom she had never met before that day. The complainant was instructed to change into 
amadoki, which is bridal attire. An amount of R8 000 was paid as lobola and various traditional 
ceremonies were performed. A few days later, she fled from her new marital home; however, she 
was found and promptly returned by her own male family members. Thereafter, she was beaten 
severely by the Appellant for refusing to wear her bridal attire again. The Appellant subsequently 
took her to Cape Town against her will. During her stay there, the Appellant raped her after she 
refused to have sexual intercourse with him. In addition, he beat her severely in an attempt to 
subdue her. The complainant finally managed to escape to a nearby taxi rank where two women 
took her to the nearest police station. By then, she has been raped seven times and suffered open, 
septic wounds as a result of the assaults. 
The Appellant was charged and convicted in the Wynberg regional court on charges of rape, 
human trafficking, assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and common assault. On 
appeal, he relied on the defence that he was in a customary marriage with the complainant and 
that it is an integral part of ukuthwala that the potential bride may not only be coerced but will 
invariably pretend to object. The court invited several organizations and experts on the practice 
of ukuthwala to assist as amicus curiae. 
The experts highlighted that ukuthwala was not properly performed in this case due to the young 
age of the complainant, her lack of consent and the fact that lobola was paid before the 
ukuthwalaoccurred was an indication that this was not a true instance of ukuthwala.90 It was 
further pointed out that this is not a unique situation as ukuthwala is often abused to justify rape 
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and violence. The amici identified this abhorrent practice as a severe and intolerable violation of 
women and children’s rights.91 
In its judgment, the trial court failed to address the practice of ukuthwala and its harmful effects. 
The Magistrate, with respect, incorrectly, held that the matter was not about ukuthwala and its 
place in our constitutional democracy.92However, based on the submission of the amici curiae 
regarding the traditional and aberrant forms of ukuthwala, the High Court evaluated the 
appellant’s submission that his actions were justifiable as he was simply observing a customary 
practice. The Court took judicial notice of submissions made on the practice of ukuthwala in as 
far as it is regarded as a cloak for violence and sexual abuse against women and children. The 
Court denounced this practice as an extreme and fundamental violation of women and girls’ most 
basic rights, including the right to equality, dignity, freedom and security of the person as well as 
freedom from slavery. Furthermore, the court held that practices associated with aberrant form of 
ukuthwala cannot secure protection under our law and it could not be found that the appellant 
had neither trafficked the complainant nor committed the rapes without the necessary intention 
on the precarious ground that this form of ukuthwala led to a “putative customary marriage.”93 
Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. 
It is the author’s view that the High Court correctly held that ukuthwala should not be used as a 
defence for abducting and assaulting women and young girls. In her dissertation, Patricia 
Nzimande argues that the court should have considered the appellant’s cultural defence as 
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research shows that brutality was traditionally employed when ukuthwala took place.94 She 
submits that the accused in Jezile v S, “had a mistaken yet genuine belief that his conduct of 
thwalaing the child was justified under customary law.”95This submission is made to support the 
principle that fault only exists when the accused intentionally commits unlawful conduct with the 
knowledge that it is unlawful.96 
 This argument is mistaken firstly because as explained earlier, ukuthwala is a prelude to a 
customary marriage, and in this case the abduction took place after the marriage. , Therefore, it 
cannot be submitted that the abduction and sexual intercourse (which constitutes statutory rape) 
took place as “requisites and formality of the custom.” Furthermore, Nzimande’s argument that 
the appellant was not aware of the unlawfulness of his conduct is incorrect because it is evident 
that the complainant did not give her consent as she was simply informed by her family that she 
would be marrying the appellant, and in addition she ran away from the appellant’s home on two 
separate occasions. 
The Maputo Protocol makes it clear that harmful cultural practices fall within the parameters of 
violence against women and cannot be condoned regardless of the situation in which they are 
perpetrated.97Therefore, even if the appellant had acted bona fide, the exercise of cultural rights 
may not be inconsistent with any other provisions in the Bill of Rights.98 The Constitution’s 
position is quite clear in this regard: customary law is subordinate to the Bill of Rights, which 
was given the pride of place in the Constitution.99  It is suggested that culture is protected so that 
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it may advance human rights, instead of derogating against or diminishing such rights. Our 
courts appear to be in agreement with these submissions as was seen in Christian Education of 
South Africa v Minister of Education,100 where the Constitutional Court held that the rights of 
communities that associate on the basis of language, culture and religion cannot be used to shield 
practices which offend the Bill of Rights. The above-mentioned case of Jezile v S can be used to 
support the point that our courts should not uphold the practice of ukuthwala as it infringes on 
several constitutional rights.101 
2.3.2 The Conflict between Ukuthwala and Human Rights 
It is the author’s submission that ukuthwala, in both its traditional and deviant form, stems from 
a patriarchal system which reinforces gender stereotypes and the status of men as superior 
beings. The practice, therefore, infringes on section 9 of the Constitution which entrenches the 
right to equality and prohibits unfair discrimination based on numerous grounds, including sex 
and gender. 
Furthermore, this practice promotes child marriages in instances where girls under the age of 18 
“consent” to the process; and this directly contradicts international human rights norms which 
provide that the betrothal and marriage of a child should be of no legal effect. The African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child defines a child as any human being under the age 
of 18 and unequivocally prohibits child marriages by children under this age.102 Therefore, the 
practice of ukuthwala undoubtedly infringes on women’s and children’s rights as most of the 
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victims are girls below the age of 18 who cannot legally consent to marriage. To this end, the 
abhorrent form of ukuthwala is tantamount to legitimating child marriages.  
Furthermore, the Preamble of the Maputo Protocol provides that state parties shall enact 
appropriate national legislative measures to guarantee, inter alia, free and full consent of both 
parties to the marriage. Thus, the right to free and full consent to a marriage in terms of CEDAW 
and the African Charter cannot be achieved if one of the parties is not sufficiently mature to 
make an informed decision. 
While the parties may act bona fide when the original requirements of ukuthwala are met, this 
has ultimately opened the floodgates to trenchant violations of the practice as it has become 
difficult to regulate the boundaries of this practice in terms of customary law. In essence, this 
practice allows domestic violence and child marriage to flourish. Empirical evidence by the 
Commission on Gender Equality has proven that abduction and kidnapping incidents are often 
accompanied by violent sexual and physical abuse as well as intimidation and harassment.103 The 
practices described in this chapter all have directly involved the perpetration of violence against 
women. In the next chapter, I consider the manner in which many customary law practices 
indirectly legitimate the perpetration of violence against women through entrenching 
assumptions that underpin such violence.  
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Chapter 3 
Customary Practices and Attitudes which Indirectly Contribute to Domestic Violence 
Due to its development in an era dominated by patriarchy, customary law is often in conflict with 
human rights obligations aimed at attaining gender equality in areas such as guardianship, 
inheritance, appointment to traditional offices, and the exercise of traditional authority.104 
Discriminatory traditional practices often contribute to domestic violence in an indirect manner 
through the entrenchment of attitudes which promote domestic violence.  For instance, many 
cultural practices are based on the premise that women are subject to the control of their male 
family members or husbands, in the case of married women. Such notions may result in the use 
of violence to exert or maintain such control.  South African courts have made significant strides 
to address discriminatory practices especially in the area of inheritance. The rule of 
primogeniture is an example of a customary law practice that has been addressed. 
3.1. The Rule of Male Primogeniture 
The rule of male primogeniture is central to the customary law of succession and for years, it was 
practiced without challenge despite its discriminatory and misogynistic nature. Its general 
application allows only a male who is related to the deceased to qualify as an intestate heir thus 
precluding women in the intestate succession of deceased estates.105 In a monogamous family, 
the eldest son of the family head is his heir and if the deceased is not survived by any male 
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descendants, his father succeeds him. If the deceased’s father does not survive him, an heir is 
sought among the father’s male descendants.106 
Several judgments by South African courts have addressed the dogmatic impact of the male 
primogeniture rule on the right to equality. However, in the past courts have also promoted this 
rule; thus entrenching women’s subordination to men. The case of Mthembu v Letsela is a prime 
example of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s initial failure to uphold the constitutional value of 
equality.107 In this case, an application to declare the rule of male primogeniture invalid was 
dismissed. The court held that the existence of a duty on male members of the family to support 
the widow and her children rendered the differentiation justifiable. However, this decision was 
overturned in the Bhe case.108 
In Bhe, two minor daughters were ineligible to inherit from their father's intestate estate in 
accordance with section 23 of the Black Administration Act and its regulations which required 
the devolution of an African’s estate to be made according to custom. Customary law as codified 
under section 33of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927and regulation 2(e) of the 
Administration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks provided that female children 
and illegitimate children were not entitled to inherit intestate from their father's estate. The estate 
thus devolved to the deceased's father, who was named sole heir and successor.  
The Constitutional court simultaneously heard the Shibi case,109in which Ms. Shibi, the 
deceased's sister, was ineligible to become heir of the deceased's intestate estate, notwithstanding 
the fact that the deceased had neither a civil nor customary law wife, was childless, and did not 
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have surviving parents or grandparents. Among other sections, section 23(2)and regulation 2(e) 
of the Black Administration Act were challenged in the High Court, where both sections were 
found to be discriminatory on the grounds of race, sex, and gender, and thus contrary to section 
9(3)of the South African Constitution.110The case went up to the Constitutional Court which 
further held that the section was also contrary to the right to dignity, and in so far as it precluded 
minors and extramarital children from inheriting, the regime violated the rights of children 
(section 28) in the Constitution as it subjected children to unfair discrimination on the basis of 
sex and birth. The Court found that the infringement of these rights was not justifiable in terms 
of the section 36 and therefore the court struck down section 23 pursuant to section 172(1)(a)of 
the constitution, which provides that any legislation inconsistent with the Constitution must be 
declared invalid.111 
In the absence of the impugned provisions, the Constitutional Court held that the customary rule 
of primogeniture which excluded women from being appointed as heirs constituted unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of sex and gender, violated women's dignity and discriminated 
against female and extra-marital children.112The exclusion of women from inheritance on the 
grounds of gender is undeniably a violation of section 9(3) of the Constitution and the court 
found that this form of discrimination is exacerbated by old notions of patriarchy and male 
domination incompatible with the guarantee of equality under the constitutional order.113 
In addition, the principle of primogeniture was held to be a violation of section 10 of the 
Constitution, the right to dignity, as it implies that women are not fit or competent to own and 
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administer property. Its effect is also to place these women under the control of male heirs, 
simply by virtue of their sex and gender. Their dignity is further affronted by the fact that they 
are denied the right to be holders of property, which other members of the population have.114 
The court held that the exclusion of women from inheritance is indicative of a system dominated 
by a deeply embedded patriarchy in which women are regarded as perpetual minors under the 
tutelage of the male family members or husbands.115The Constitutional Court shared Nhlapo’s 
sentiments that it is imperative to protect women and children from distortions masquerading as 
custom.116In its majority judgment delivered by Langa DCJ, the Court concluded that the 
primogeniture rule cannot be reconciled with the notions of equality and human dignity as 
contained in the Bill of Rights.117 
As a result, the rule of primogeniture was struck down and the court had to decide on an 
appropriate remedy for the unconstitutionality of the rule. The court chose not develop the rule in 
terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution because there was insufficient evidence before the 
court to enable it to ascertain the true content of the customary law. Amongst other reasons, the 
majority judgment reasoned that the development of customary law on a case-by-case basis 
would be very slow whereas there is an urgent need to prevent ongoing human rights violations. 
The decision to strike down this rule resulted in an immediate change which was considered by 
traditional leaders as a judicial encroachment on customary practices.118 They contended that any 
decision to abolish or alter any rule of African customary law must not constitute an unjustifiable 
limitation on the right to culture. The court, they argued, should have found a more appropriate 
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balance between the right of women to equality, and the right of individuals or communities to 
culture.119 
The minority judgment offered a different approach in suggesting how customary law should be 
developed. In his judgment, Ngcobo J opted for the development of customary law as an 
alternative to the abolition of the impugned rule. He noted that the obligation to develop is 
particularly important in customary law because the striking down of a rule of customary law 
signifies its demise. He further referred to the two contexts where it is imperative to develop 
customary law; firstly, where it is necessary to adapt customary law to changed circumstances in 
order to meet the needs of the community in which it operates and secondly, the development of 
customary law may be necessary in order to bring it in line with the rights and values in the Bill 
of Rights. In the present case, the court was concerned with the development of the rule of 
primogeniture so as to bring it in line with the right to equality: thus the rule would be tested 
against the right to equality and if found deficient, the solution would be to develop it. 
In my view, the only shortcoming in Ngcobo J’s judgment is his approach to developing 
customary law without considering the social context. In order for judgments to be applicable 
effectively, a proper balance needs to be applied between living customary law and legislation. 
Living customary law has actively steered a significant portion of the country’s population for a 
long time, and its observers are more inclined to abide by customary rules compared to 
legislation imposed by the state.120 Therefore, any intervention by the state will fail if it is 
perceived as imposing on pre-existing rules, practices and customs. It is therefore the author’s 
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suggestion that courts must engage with the cultural norms of the communities whose rules they 
seek to develop, in order to prevent the ineffectiveness of these judgments. 
In addition, the majority’s decision not to develop customary law on a case-by-case basis is 
problematic. The nature of customary law is fluid and this presents challenges in ascertaining its 
context. Furthermore, customs are often observed differently from one traditional community to 
the other. As a result, a one-size-fits-all approach or blanket development of customary law will 
be ineffective because it might not reflect the realities of the people affected by the customary 
laws. However, this can be prevented if customary law is approached on a case-to-case basis. In 
other instances, the development of customary law can be left to the traditional authorities, for 
instance in the Shilubana case, the Constitutional Court gave recognition to the development of 
customary law which was undertaken by the traditional authorities.121 
In this case, the Constitutional Court tackled whether traditional authorities may develop the rule 
of male primogeniture in the context of succession of a traditional leadership position. The 
appellant’s father died in 1968 without a male heir, and, therefore, he was succeeded by his 
brother, Hosi Richard as Chief of the Valoyi traditional community in accordance with the rule 
of primogeniture. The discriminatory nature of this rule stemmed from the applicant’s inability to 
replace her father as chief of the tribe, simply because of her gender. During the reign and with 
the participation of Hosi Richard, the Royal Family met and unanimously decided to confer 
chieftainship on the applicant, Ms Shilubana. The applicant decided that Hosi Richard would 
continue in his position as chief for an unspecified period of time. However, when Hosi Richard 
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died, his son, Mr Nwamitwa, instituted proceedings seeking a declaratory order that he was heir 
to the chieftainship and thus entitled to succeed the late Hosi.122 
The dispute in Shilubana arose out of the decision of the Royal Council of the Valoyi traditional 
community to develop the customary law of succession to chieftaincy by “electing” the daughter 
of the late Hosi who passed away in1968 where she could have succeeded him. The purpose of 
the election was to align the customary law rule of male primogeniture with the Bill of Rights. 
Shilubana was heard on appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal which had 
upheld the rule of male primogeniture. The argument advanced in the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal was that as far as the Valoyi traditional community was concerned, 
there was neither precedent nor evidence of a female being appointed as chief even if she was 
first born.123The issue before the Constitutional Court was whether the traditional community 
has the authority to restore the position of traditional leadership to the house from which it was 
removed as a result of gender bias and discrimination.  
The Court examined whether the reliance onpast practice establishes the customary law rule with 
certainty. It held that the legal status of customary law norms cannot depend simply on their 
having been consistently applied in the past because the recognition of past practice prevents any 
new development.124 It was held that even though the succession to leadership of the Valoyi 
community had previously operated in accordance with the principle of male primogeniture, a 
community should be empowered to act so as to bring its norms and practices in line with the 
spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of Rights. In this case, the traditional authorities did so in 
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accordance with right to equality and since the change in customary law did not cause legal 
uncertainty, Mr Nwamitwa did not have a vested right to be Hosi.125 
The trilogy of cases raises an important question about the role of the courts in developing 
customary law. It has been argued that judicial development in accordance with section 39(2) of 
the Constitution is the key to ending the conflict between African customary law and human 
rights. This section provides that when developing customary law, every court or tribunal must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Thus, any patriarchal laws would be 
developed to reflect constitutional rights. The current state of customary law of succession has 
developed mostly due to judicial innovation. However, it is evident from the above case 
discussions, that the Constitutional Court is often divided on the manner in which customary law 
should be developed or whether it should even be developed. As a result, the efficacy of judicial 
development of African customary law can be questioned. 
3.2. The Effect of Gender Discrimination in African Customary Marriage Laws 
Traces of patriarchy are not only evident in the customary law of succession. In its application, 
African customary law is often discriminatory in family law, especially in matters concerning 
marriage. As highlighted in the Bhe case above, women often have the status of minors under 
customary law and they are subject to the control of male family members. For instance, while 
the status of men increased as a result of marriage, women were seen as simply exchanging the 
control of their fathers for control by their husbands. This was confirmed by official customary 
rules which regarded a married woman as being “under the marital power” of her husband, and 
thus in a state of perpetual legal minority.126 The legislature has attempted to level the playing 
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field by enacting the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act which prohibits all forms of 
discrimination against women, in the context of customary marriages.127 
However, this piece of legislation is inconsistent with the Constitution in a number of respects as 
indicated in the case of Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa.128 In casu, the 
Constitutional Court confirmed that section 7(1) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
was invalid as it provided that the proprietary consequences of a customary marriage entered into 
before the commencement of the Act continue to be governed by customary law. This had the 
effect that customary law was codified in the provincial legislation of Kwazulu-Natal where the 
parties were domiciled. 
The Applicant, Mrs Gumede who was married under customary law in 1968, approached the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation of a declaration by the High Court on the constitutional 
invalidity of section 20 of the Kwazulu Act,129 which when read with subsection 20 and 22 of the 
Natal Code had the effect that a wife in a customary marriage concluded before the 
commencement of the RCMA had no claim to the family property either during or upon 
dissolution of the marriage.  The court a quo declared the said provisions to be invalid due to 
their discriminatory nature.130 
The Court found that the codified customary law in Kwazulu-Natal subjected women married 
under customary law to the marital power of their husbands, who were the exclusive owners of 
all family property. The impugned provisions constituted unfair discrimination prima facie on 
the ground of gender as only the women in a customary marriage were subject to unequal 
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proprietary consequences.131 In addition, the legislation was found to constitute unfair 
discrimination, in as far as it differentiated between a woman who is a party to a pre-recognition 
customary marriage and a woman who is a party to a post-recognition customary marriage.132 
The Constitutional Court held that the government’s argument regarding the power of divorce 
courts to make an equitable order regarding the proprietary consequence applies only upon the 
dissolution of the marriage; during its course the wife was obliged to endure unfair 
discrimination. Consequently, the impugned provisions were not justifiable under section 36 of 
the Constitution; and, therefore, the decision of the High Court was affirmed. 
The Gumede case brought into sharp focus what has been coined as “the stubborn persistence of 
patriarchy” and conversely, the vulnerability of many women during and upon the dissolution of 
customary marriages.133It is evident from the above case discussion that customary law has an 
influence on the subordination of women as it often results in the deprivation of the legal rights 
of women, particularly in relation to inheritance claims and property rights. 
In line with the concern surrounding the subordination of women in traditional African 
customary law, Green maintains that another factor contributing to the cultural acceptability of 
domestic violence is the extent to which women are viewed as “property,” as opposed to beings 
of equal status with their male counterparts under customary law, more pertinently wherelobolo 
or bride price has been tendered for their hands in marriage.134 
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3.3 The Indirect Effects of Lobolo on Domestic Violence 
The payment of a bride price or lobolo as a prerequisite for a customary marriage is generally 
practiced in African communities. This practice is so deeply rooted in living customary law to 
the extent that a couple is not considered married if lobolo has not been paid.135Although the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act does not recognise lobolo as a specific requirement for 
the validity of a customary marriage, this is presumably included in the provision which states 
that customary marriage “must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with 
customary law.”136 
3.3.1. The Traditional Application of Lobolo 
The traditional lobolo process involves negotiations by male family members of the parties who 
intend to get married, for the payment of lobolo which could be in the form of cattle and other 
livestock.137 The father of the prospective groom with the assistance of male family members 
would pay lobolo for his son's first marriage.138 Proponents of the practice argue that the 
payment of lobolo is a symbol of gratitude to the bride’s family for raising and educating her. 
However, this is incorrect because firstly, the payment of lobolo is obligatory not voluntary. 
Secondly, it cannot be argued that lobolo is merely a token of appreciation to the potential bride's 
family when, in practice, lobolo grant husbands the exercise of certain rights over their wives on 
the basis that they paid lobolo, and wives assume certain roles in marriage on the basis that 
lobolo was paid for them.139 Shenje-Peyton argues that a lobolo system which truly serves as a 
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measure of gratitude between in-laws would not “produce the feelings of ownership that men 
who have paid lobolo exhibit toward their wives.”140 
Another objective for the payment of lobolo was the transfer of a woman’s reproductive rights to 
her prospective husband's family. Women’s reproductive rights include the right to control their 
fertility through the use of contraceptives and the right to make decisions pertaining to the 
number of children they wish to have.141 However after the payment of lobolo, the woman would 
be unable to freely make any reproductive choices unless her husband or his family approves. 
This objective, therefore, imposes an unjustifiable limitation on the constitutional right to make 
decisions concerning reproduction.142 
Furthermore, even in it its traditional form; the lobolo practice had patriarchal undertones as 
female family members were generally excluded from lobolo negotiations. This was debated in 
Mabena v Letsoalo,143 where the appellant argued that in terms of customary law, the mother of 
the bride did not qualify as her daughter’s guardian for purposes of contracting and receiving 
lobolo as she herself was under the guardianship of her husband or her father. The court found 
that a rule which allows a woman who is the head of her family to negotiate and receive lobolo is 
not repugnant to the customary law of marriage.144 However, the court failed to address the 
inherent discrimination in this customary practice which only allows women to take part in 
lobolo negotiations only in exceptional circumstances. 
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3.3.2. The Current Practice of Lobolo and its Contribution to Patriarchal Attitudes. 
Like many other customary institutions, the lobolo practice has evolved in order to adapt to the 
needs of its communities. For instance, lobolo is now generally accepted in the form of cash or 
property instead of livestock. A further change to the practice is the payment of lobolo by 
prospective grooms themselves instead of their families.145Managay submits that the historical 
symbolism of lobolo as a token of appreciation to the bride’s family has becomes subsumed by 
motives of greed and enrichment on the part of the prospective brides’ families.146 
 It has become quite common for the prospective bride’s family to demand an assortment of 
gadgets, in addition to exorbitant amounts of money as part of the lobolo for their daughter.  In 
this sense, lobolo has evolved to take the form of a commercial transaction linked to the 
educational qualifications and other attributes of the prospective wife and her family.147 The 
value of lobolo is now generally determined by the woman’s level of education or her family’s 
affluence. Thus, lobolo has served to turn women into tools of enrichment for their families.  
3.3.3. Patriarchy and Domestic Violence 
Recent developments to the practice of lobolo have resulted in underlying perceptions amongst 
both men and women that domestic violence is justifiable because men claim to have “paid” for 
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their wives.148 Such attitudes ultimately contribute to domestic violence as women ostensibly 
become the property of their husbands after marriage.149 
It is primarily in this regard that there is strong opposition to the criminalization of marital rape, 
as most men believe that since the wife has been paid for, she is obliged to fulfill her husband’s 
sexual needs. The case of S v Mvamvu best illustrates the entrenchment of such attitudes.150 The 
complainant who had been married in customary law for four years left her husband (the 
accused) due to marital problems and returned to live in her brother's home. She assumed that the 
marriage had ended, but the husband regarded the marriage as extant, because the lobolo he had 
paid in respect of the complainant had not been returned by her family.151 In an attempt to get the 
complainant to return to his home he kidnapped and raped her on two occasions, despite the 
existenceof a domestic violence interdict against him. Furthermore, the accused threatened her 
with a knife and also threatened to douse her with petrol and burn her.152The Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that the court a quo was entitled to depart from the mandatory minimum life 
sentence for rape on the grounds that: 
“It would appear at the time of the offence that the couple was indeed in all probability 
still formally married under customary law. It is clear from his evidence that at the time 
of the incidents the accused honestly (albeit entirely misguidedly) believed that he had 
some ``right'' to conjugal benefits.”153 
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The court found the accused guilty on the abduction, assault and rape charges, and he was 
sentenced to ten years in respect of each of the two counts of rape.154 In reaching its decision, the 
court found that; 
“His actions, though totally unacceptable in law, might well be (albeit only to a limited 
extent) explicable given his background…His actions were shaped and molded by the 
norms, beliefs and customary practices by which he lived his life. Though the rapes were 
accompanied by some acts or threats of violence, it does not appear that the prime 
objective was to do the complainant harm. The key aim, it seems, was to subjugate the 
complainant to his will and to persuade her to return to him – a consequence of male 
chauvinism, perhaps associated with traditional customary practices…These ingrained 
traits and habits of the accused cannot be ignored when considering an appropriate 
sentence. ”155 
While the court can be commended for recognizing the patriarchal attitudes inherent in 
customary law, it is the author’s opinion that such attitudes should not used to rationalize 
domestic violence and ultimately, the court gave more weight to the traditional beliefs than the 
complainant’s rights and this effectively watered down the egregious nature of the offence. 
Furthermore, thecourt a quo, in my view, indirectly promoted the perception that husbands have 
the right to conjugal benefits during the course of the marriage. 
Secondly, it appears that the Supreme Court of Appeal disregarded the trauma, psychological 
and psycho-social implications that the rape incidents had on the woman once it was shown that 
these incidents took place while the parties were still married under customary law.156The 
reasoning provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for departing from the mandatory sentence 
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reflects a misunderstanding of the fact that rape is a crime of violence regardless of the existence 
of a relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.157 The court’s justification for a 
departure from the mandatory sentence minimizes the inherent violence of rape in the context of 
a marriage. This has long-term negative effects on sentencing, as courts fail to recognise and 
adequately punish crimes of marital rape. 
It is quite evident that despite its deep entrenchment in living customary law, lobolo perpetuates 
the subordination of women and contributes to patriarchal attitudes which justify domestic 
violence. As a result, the subject of lobolo has been mired with controversy for quite a number of 
years.158 The patriarchal attitudes underlying lobolo feed into the culture of domestic violence as 
seen in the case of S v Mvamvu. Patriarchal conceptions about women as property ultimately lead 
to discriminatory laws of succession which deny women the right to inherit property. Customary 
practices such as the rule of primogeniture facilitate domestic violence in an indirect manner as 
they ensure that women remain economically dependent to their abusers. General Comment 19 
recognizes that lack of economic independence forces women to stay in violent relationships. 
Furthermore, traditional attitudes regarding the subordinate role of women perpetuate violence of 
all kinds.The Maputo Protocol acknowledges that social and cultural constructions about the role 
of men and women amount to justifications for violence against women. This is evident from the 
obligation placed on states to eliminate patriarchal attitudes.159 
The question which follows is whether these practices are capable of development in line with 
the Bill of Rights. Despite the development of lobolo to reflect gender equality in contemporary 
cases such as Mabena v Letsoalo, courts mostly adhere to the patriarchal version of customary 
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law.160 Traditionalists have argued that the abolishment of lobolo would result in the destruction 
of culture, and thus there is a broad consensus on the need to reform this practice.161 
However, lobolo is an impediment to the full realization of the fundamental constitutional rights 
that are conferred on South African women. Developing lobolo in line with the Constitution 
would require the practice to reflect constitutional values such as equality. This can be achieved 
if an obligation is placed on the prospective spouses to present gifts of equal value to both of 
their families at the time of the marriage. If the gifts are of equal value, this will 
eliminatestereotypes of women being the property of their husbands, prevent the transfer of a 
woman’s rights and stop the commercialization of lobolo.162 Furthermore, this development still 
serves to achieve the objective of bringing families together and compensating parents. An 
obligation put on both male and female children to compensate their in-laws would eradicate any 
undertones of one spouse being superior or inferior to the other.163 
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Chapter 4 
Recommendations 
4.1 Direct Legislative Interventions  
This dissertation has identified several discriminatory cultural practices and patriarchal attitudes 
which have persisted despite the constitutional recognition of women’s rights. The adherence to 
harmful customary practices creates a challenge to the implementation and acceptance of 
domestic violence laws, particularly in traditional communities. A great deal of controversy 
exists regarding the role of legislative action against pervasive cultural practices which are 
deemed to violate women’s rights. Although the Domestic Violence Act has been hailed as 
groundbreaking legislation in as far as it aims to protect women from all forms of violence,164 
this Act does not adequately provide strategies that take into consideration cultural, social and 
economic factors as the forces within which domestic violence is embedded.165 
Furthermore, our courts often fail to interpret this legislation so it can address harmful cultural 
norms and practices.  For instance, in the Jezile case, the court failed to fulfill its duty to develop 
customary law in line with the Bill of Rights. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, it was established 
that the abhorrent form of ukuthwala facilitates child marriages and forced marriages: however, 
the court failed to address the underlying basis for violence against women.  Furthermore, the 
legislative inconsistency regarding the age of consent to marriage in South Africa was not 
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remedied. As a result, South Africa has still not met its international obligation to specify the age 
of eighteen as the minimum age of consent to a marriage.  
A lesson can be drawn out of the Zimbabwean Domestic Violence Act which expressly outlines 
certain cultural practices as acts of domestic violence.166 Under this Act, child marriage is 
criminalized and defined as a situation where one or both parties to a marriage, whether under 
customary or general law, is below the age of 18 at the time of the marriage.167 In Mudzuru and 
Anor v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & Ors, the Zimbabwean 
Constitutional Court outlawed child marriages by striking down section 22(1) of the Marriage 
Act and any law or customary practice which allows minors to conclude a marriage. 
Furthermore, the court held that “with effect from 20 January 2016, no person male or female, 
may enter into any marriage, including anunregistered customary law union or any other union 
including one arising out of religion or religious rite, before attaining the age of 18 years.”168 
As a result of the above provisions in the Zimbabwean Domestic Violence Act, a practice known 
as musengabere which is substantially similar to the current form of ukuthwala has been 
abolished and anyone who attempts to conclude a marriage using this practice is charged for 
kidnapping and rape, where applicable. Musengabere was recognized as a legitimate system of 
marriage among the traditional Shona people.169 This was a custom where a young man would 
scout for a woman to marry and thereafter, he would ambush the woman and drag her home. If 
                                                             
166 Domestic Violence Act of 2007. 
167 Chirawu-Mugomba “A Reflection on the Domestic Violence Act and Harmful Cultural Practices in Zimbabwe” 
2016 Zimbabwe Electronic Law Journal 8. 
168Ibid. 
169 Mwandayi “Towards a Reform of the Christian Understanding of Shona Traditional Marriages in Light of Ancient 
Israelite Marriages” 2017, 5. 
53 
 
he managed to drag her home even against her own will, the young woman automatically 
became his wife.170 
As alluded to above, it is currently a criminal offense to revert to such a form of marriage in 
Zimbabwe as a marriage can only be valid with the consent of both parties. Furthermore, the 
Zimbabwean Domestic Violence Act prohibits forced marriages and identifies forced marriage 
as one of the harmful cultural practice that discriminates against and degrades women.171 This is 
important as the Act highlights consent as an important dimension for the prevention of violence 
against women.  
 It is, therefore, suggested that new legislation should be enacted in South Africa with provisions 
which will “make an unequivocal statement against forced marriages, clarifying in the process 
the question of marriageable age.”172 The Commission for Gender Equality and the South 
African Law Reform Commission has called for a criminal statute which merges issues relating 
to child marriages and forced marriages into a single Act. In order to achieve this objective, the 
Prohibition of Forced Marriages and Child Marriages Bill has been drafted. The SALC 
recommends that this statute should criminalize the conduct of forced marriages and the conduct 
of people who aid and abet such marriages.173 
 
4.2. Addressing underlying Cultural Attitudes 
In addition to the legal reform initiatives discussed above, women must be taught and 
empowered to stand against cultural practices which undermine their rights. The Maputo 
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Protocol guarantees that women have the right to live in a positive cultural environment and to 
participate at all levels in the determination of cultural practices.174  Therefore, girls should be 
empowered through education about their rights, the existence of protective measures and legal 
avenues offered by the Domestic Violence Act and other applicable legislation. Such information 
should be integrated into school curricula. This will enable them to challenge harmful cultural 
practices and it will teach young boys about the effects of patriarchal attitudes and practices. 
 
The Domestic Violence Act fails to provide for non-legal preventative measures such as public 
education even though this is a regional obligation for the elimination of harmful practices and 
patriarchal stereotypes. This measure is not only important for the purpose of raising awareness 
amongst women, it is also necessary to educate police and judicial personnel who handle 
domestic violence cases on a daily basis.  The Commission cites the unhelpful attitudes and 
ineffective approach of the police as factors contributing to the widespread reluctance to press 
charges.175 This arises as a result of the failure to provide adequate training and public education. 
Although the Act lists the duties of police officials, it does not contain specific provisions 
addressing the training requirements for these officials.  
 
It is fairly common for national governments to prioritize keeping family structures intact even at 
the expense of women’s rights and safety.176 As a result, many women in South Africa find it 
difficult to report cases of domestic violence as the police consider this to be a private matter that 
needs to be resolved by the parties. This is another effect of cultural conditioning. Consequently, 
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criminal law is considered to be an inadequate tool for the resolution of the domestic violence 
scourge because it merely punishes the offender without seeking to solve the underlying 
problem. 177 
 Hunter notes that relying on legal reform to combat domestic violence is “an attempt to use the 
master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house” as the law upholds a social order which allows 
for violence against women.178 This submission is supported by cases such as S v Mvamvu which 
was discussed earlier in this dissertation wherein the courts promoted attitudes that uphold men’s 
impunity in the household and positioned women as passive victims.179 
It is evident that the law cannot effectively combat domestic violence without the aid of non-
legal measures. An interrogation of underlying social and cultural attitudes is necessary. Hunter 
suggests that the continued mobilization of women to challenge social constructionsof women as 
victims, or as complicit in the violence against them, by publicly challenging the failures of the 
legal system as a whole, may be a means through which legal reform contributes to the long term 
transformation of gender relations.180This allows women to use the law as a way to legitimise 
women’s rights, and bring the issue of domestic violence into the public domain. Thus, women’s 
legal activism has the potential to radically change gender relations, thereby contributing to the 
prevention of violence against women.181 
Beninger shares the sentiment that the process of eradicating violence against women is 
fundamentally challenged by deeply-rooted power structures which subordinate women thus, the 
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most effective way to combat domestic violence is to ensure that approaches to eradicating 
domestic violence have local roots and reflect local realities.182 
This is further supported by Tamale who refers to this approach as a bottom-up approach which 
requires legal reform to be anchored in local cultures and traditions as opposed to top-down legal 
reform which imposes international standards that cannot hold the same social legitimacy as 
familiar cultural norms and values.183 
 
From this perspective, it is clear that South Africa’s failure to acknowledge cultural factors as 
part of its legal reform may be contributing to the ineffectiveness of the law. Mogale criticizes 
the Domestic Violence Act for its failure to highlight how cultural and social influences should 
be addressed in order to combat domestic violence.The identification of cultural barriers or 
impediments to human rights standards is not sufficient without consideration to how they may 
be adapted and integrated into domestic laws in order to promote human rights. However, such 
adaptation must not compromise the cultural legitimacy of traditional communities. 
The positive core values that resonate from indigenous cultures must be used to engender 
transformation by tackling discriminatory practices which exacerbate domestic violence.184The 
value of ubuntu, for instance, is largely observed in traditional communities and recognized by 
our courts. This concept entails that respect and dignity should be afforded to every person due 
to their intrinsic worth as a human being. It regulates the mutual enjoyment of rights by all 
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members of the community.185Ubuntu can be used as a vehicle for the transformation of 
patriarchal practices as it carries notions of humaneness, social justice and fairness.186 
The author suggests that traditional African leaders must play a role in resolving domestic 
violence in their communities and they must be involved in the implementation of domestic 
violence laws as it was found in the Shilubana case that they have the authority to develop 
discriminatory practices to reflect gender equality. This will also facilitate internal dialogue and 
afford legitimacy to women’s rights in traditional communities. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this dissertation was to examine the root causes underlying the domestic 
violence scourge in South Africa despite the excellently crafted legal framework. Particular 
focus was given to direct effect of harmful cultural practices and the indirect contribution of 
patriarchal attitudes inherent in African customary law on the perpetuation of domestic violence. 
It has been largely observed that official customary law which aims to reflect human rights is in 
fact at variance with the living customary law. As a result, the implementation of these reformed 
laws is ineffective as they lack cultural legitimacy. 
 In order for domestic violence laws to bridge the gap between African customary law and 
human rights, these laws must reflect the realities of the victims they aim to protect. There must 
be an understanding of widespread cultural practices that legitimate violence and an attempt to 
shift them. This can be achieved by using the positive aspects of living customary law to protect 
women from violence and by developing discriminatory practices in line with the Constitution. 
Furthermore, laws must be enacted which are clear and concise as to how harmful cultural 
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practices such as child marriages and forced marriages should be addressed. Furthermore, the 
legislative inconsistency regarding the age of consent to marriage in South Africa needs to be 
remedied.  
South Africa may have an advanced statute – yet, without addressing the underlying social and 
cultural issues that cause domestic violence, it is likely to continue to be ineffective. A change in 
African customary practices in the direction of gender equality is one of the necessary steps to 
address this underlying social context.     Word Count: 14 979 
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